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THE FEES STOP HERE: STATUTORY PURPOSES LIMIT
AWARDS TO DEFENDANTS
Richard M. Stephens*

INTRODUCTION

Unlike English courts,' American courts have traditionally disfavored the
award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing parties as costs. 2 Only Alaska
provides for a regular award of fees to litigants.' This general reluctance by
most courts subsided with the emergence of three theories which justify
attorneys' fees awards: the common fund theory, the substantial benefit
theory, and the private attorney general theory.
The common fund theory provides for the award of fees to a litigant who
secures a fund from which others will benefit.4 The rationale is that one
should not bear the total expense of bringing financial benefits to others.5
The attorney's fee, however, may be paid by the opposing party and not

* Richard M. Stephens, B.A., Bob Jones University; J.D., Pepperdine University. Mr.
Stephens is a staff attorney with Pacific Legal Foundation, a public interest law firm in

Sacramento, California.
1. "As early as 1278, the courts of England were authorized to award counsel fees to
successful plaintiffs in litigation. Similarly, since 1607 English courts have been empowered to
award counsel fees to defendants .... " Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Majer Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967) (footnote omitted).
2. See Rude v. Buchhalter, 286 U.S. 451 (1932) (bank-defendant entitled to attorneys'
fees from fund relating to discharge of duties under escrow agreement but not from plaintiff);
Von Holt v. Izumo Taisha Kyo Mission, 44 Haw. 147, 355 P.2d 40 (1960) (per curiam) (taxpayer
suit annulling conveyance by city and county did not create a common fund); State v. Pearl,
163 Wash. 268, 1 P.2d 315 (1931) (criminal defendant's entitlement to fees is wholly statutory).
3. See generally Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing
the American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321 (1984) (examination and survey of
attorneys' fee shifting statutes as a response to American rule). However, Alaska rules, only
provide for a partial recovery. See ALAsKA R. CIv. P. 82(a)(l)-(3) authorized by ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.60.010 (1983).
4. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (litigant who successfully
sought a lien on earmarked funds in insolvent bank is entitled to fees because rights to funds
were created in other depositors via the principle of stare decisis); Central R.R. & Banking Co.
v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885) (attorneys of creditors who sought reclamation of property for
benefit of all creditors were entitled to lien on property); Trustees of Internal Improvement
Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882) (bondholder-plaintiff was entitled to fees from fund
in suit against trustees who were destroying fund by selling assets at nominal value).
5. The justification is rooted in the notions of unjust enrichment. See Dawson, Lawyers
and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARv. L. Rav. 1597 (1974).

490

DEPA UL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:489

necessarily out of the common fund.6 The substantial benefit theory is similar
to the common fund,7 the only difference being that the benefits to others
are nonfinancial. 8 Under the substantial benefit theory, fees are paid by the
opposing party, rather than by the "beneficiaries" of the suit.
The private attorney general theory allows an award of fees to successful
litigants who act as "attorney generals." 9 Although courts may use different

6. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980) (other beneficiaries of fund paid
fee); Coalition for Los Angeles County Planning in the Pub. Interest v. Board of Supervisors,
76 Cal. App. 3d 241, 142 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1977) (decided on substantial benefit theory). But cf.
Glendale City Employees' Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 15 Cal. 3d 328, 341 n.19, 540 P.2d
609, 618 n.19, 124 Cal. Rptr. 513, 522 n.19 (1975) (other beneficiaries of fund paid attorneys'
fees), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal
Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 694-95 (1974).
7. The substantial benefit theory is a more recent development than the common fund
theory. See D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 25, 520 P.2d 10, 28, 112
Cal. Rptr. 786, 804 (1974). The theory has been applied in a generally limited manner by the
federal courts. See United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 595 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1979); Key
West Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v. Connecticut Indem. Co., 54 Bankr. 978 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
One court has described this theory as "an outgrowth of the 'common fund' doctrine." Serrano
v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 38, 569 P.2d 1303, 1309, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (1977). See Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (former union member's action establishing free speech rights in union,
entitled him to fees from union treasury).
Fletcher v. A. J. Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968) provides a
good example of the application of this doctrine. In a stockholders' derivative action, the
plaintiffs obtained an approval of a settlement which would result in beneficial change in
management. Although no "fund" was created, the court shifted the attorneys' fees to the
defendant so that the cost of producing the benefit would not fall on the individual stockholders
who brought suit. Id. at 325, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 153-54.
8. See Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972). In Newman, a class
action suit brought by state prisoners successfully challenged inadequate medical treatment as
cruel and unusual punishment, and attorneys' fees were awarded against the state. Id. at 286.
The case was vacated and remanded, however, in light of Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (eleventh
amendment prohibits monetary recovery from state in federal court absent state's consent).
9. The private attorney general theory developed in the early 1970s. See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff awarded attorneys' fees notwithstanding that he had been represented without charge by public interest group, but stating that
the award should be paid directly to the group that provided the services); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., v. Environmental Protection Agency, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973)
(award of attorneys' fees sanctioned by the express language of the Clean Air Amendments);
Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d*475 (7th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff who was wrongfully discharged
from his employment at state mental hospital was entitled to attorneys' fees), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 955 (1973); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972) (court ordered attorneys' fees
in civil rights case or, in the alternative, for the district court to articulate specific aind justifiable
reasons for its denial), appeal after remand, 493 F.2d 765, reh'g denied, 495 F.2d 1372 (1974);
Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972) (court granted union member's request to be reinstated
as member of union and awarded attorneys' fees), aff'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 1 (1973);
United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Butler Mfg. Co., 439 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1971)
(court awarded attorneys' fees against employer)..
The rationale behind the private attorney general theory was explained by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals:
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factors to determine whether to apply this doctrine, several factors predominate. First, the litigant must be successful in the suit. Second, the party
seeking fees must have sought to enforce the constitutional or statutory
rights of the plaintiff.'0 Third, the lawsuit must benefit the general public
and the suit should be one which the official attorney general will not bring.II
The courts should not encourage private litigants to interfere with the
attorney general's activities, but rather to supplement the official's litigation. 12
The federal and state courts have both begun to develop these three
justifications for awarding attorneys' fees. 3 The United States Supreme
Court, however, refused to adopt the private attorney general theory for the
federal judiciary in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society. 14 In Alyeska,

The violation of an important public policy may involve little by way of actual
damages, so far as a single individual is concerned, or little in comparison with the
cost of vindication . . . . If a defendant may feel that the cost of litigation, and,
particularly that the financial circumstances of an injured party may mean that the
chances of suit being brought, or continued in the face of opposition, will be small,
there will be little brake upon deliberate wrongdoing. In such instances public policy
may suggest an award of costs that will remove the burden from the shoulders of
the plaintiff seeking to vindicate the public right.
Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972).
10. See Woodland Hills Residents Assoc. v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 593 P.2d 200,
154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979); Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980) (common fund
claimed violation of federal and state securities statutes); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973)
(substantial benefit by establishing free speech rights).
11. See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 44, 569 P.2d 1303, 1313, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315,
325 (1977).
12. Id. See generally Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the Private Attorney General:
Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTn os L.J. 733, 758-60
(1973).
13. Many states have adopted the common fund theory. See, e.g., Winslow v. Harold
G. Ferguson Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 274, 153 P.2d 714 (1944) (beneficiaries of trust brought suit
against the trustee); Graham v. Dubuque Specialty Mach. Works, 138 Iowa 456, 114 N.W. 619
(1908) (stockholders' derivative suit); Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., 93 Tenn. 691, 28 S.W.
90 (1894) (stockholders' derivative suit); Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank 518 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.
1974) (devisees sue executors of estate), on remand, 523 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
The substantial benefit theory, although less popular than the common fund theory, is
gaining acceptance. See, e.g., Friends of "B" Street v. City of Hayward, 106 Cal. App. 3d
988, 165 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1980) (challenge to street improvement project); Weiss v. Bruno, 83
Wash. 2d 911, 523 P.2d 915 (1974) (challenge to expenditure of public funds for unconstitutional
actions).
In California, the private attorney general theory was approved by the California Supreme
Court in Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977), and was
then codified by the California legislature at CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1977)
[hereinafter section 1021.5]. See infra note 135.
14. 421 U.S. 240, The Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., and Friends
of the Earth successfully challenged the issuance of right-of-way and special land use permits
to build a road along part of the Alaskan oil pipeline. Id. at 241-43. The court of appeals
ordered the granting of attorneys' fees under the private attorney general theory. Wilderness
Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (challenge based on the National
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the Court announced that federal courts were without authority to award
attorneys' fees under the private attorney general theory in the absence of
statutory authorization."

Following the decision in Alyeska Pipeline Co., Congress and many state
legislatures created statutes providing for the judicial award of attorneys'
fees. 16 The federal response provided for the award of fees in particular
subject areas of litigation."1 Most states reacted similarly, but some codified
the elements which had emerged in the pre-Alyeska case law and created a
private attorney general statute providing for the award of fees for any
subject matter.'" Perhaps because of equal protection concerns, many of
these statutes are neutral as to which party may be awarded fees.' 9 Often
fees may go to the prevailing or successful party, rather than only to a
successful plaintiff.2 0 The legislative purpose of the party neutral language

Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370, and the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287.
15. 421 U.S. at 269. The Court declared that the American rule prohibiting the award
of attorneys' fees "is deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it is not
for us to invade the legislature's province by redistributing litigation costs in the manner
suggested by respondents and followed by the Court of Appeals." Id. at 271 (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, since Congress has chosen to "carve out specific exceptions to the general rule,"
the courts should not "pick and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under which they sue
Id. at
. 269.
16. Section 1021.5 "was an explicit reaction to the United States Supreme Court's Alyeska
decision." Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 934, 593 P.2d 200,
209, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 512 (1979).
17. See, e.g., infra note 24.
18. See, e.g., section 1021.5, supra note 13.
19. The United States Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a Texas
statute which allowed only plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees in wage disputes. Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642 (1914).
If the classification is otherwise reasonable, the mere fact that attorney's fees are
allowed to successful plaintiffs only, and not to successful defendants, does not
render the statute repugnant to the 'equal protection' clause. This is not a discrimination between different citizens or classes of citizens, since members of any and
every class may either sue or be sued ....
Even were the statute to be considered as imposing a penalty upon unsuccessful
defendants in cases within its sweep, such penalty is obviously imposed as an
incentive to prompt settlement of small but well-founded claims, and as a deterrent
of groundless defenses, which are the more oppressive where the amount is small ....
Id. at 650-51.
The Idaho Supreme Court expressly rejected a claim that a statute which authorized the
award of attorneys' fees only to prevailing plaintiffs violates equal protection. State ex rel.
Kidwell v. United States Mktg., Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 459, 631 P.2d 622, 630 (1981) (fee statute
furthers a legitimate governmental objective).
20. Federal statutes which allow fees are often limited to a specified party, usually the
plaintiff. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982) (complainant in Administrative Procedure Act
suits); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1982) (complainant in Privacy Act suits); 5 U.S.C. § 8127 (1982)
(federal workmen's compensation proceedings); 7 U.S.C. § 18(d) (1982) (petitioner in enforcement of orders of Commodity Futures Trading Commission); 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1982) (petitioner
in enforcement of orders of Secretary of Agriculture); 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1982) (petitioner in
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has provided a stumbling block to courts faced with the task of interpreting
those statutes.
In light of the history of attorneys' fees going only to plaintiffs, 2' courts
are faced with the problem of deciding under what circumstances fees may
be awarded to successful defendants in light of the fact that a defending
party is not typically regarded as a private attorney general. Furthermore,
defendants do not bring suit and may be litigating to avoid liability rather
than for an altruistic concern for the public benefit regarding the enforcement
or nonenforcement of a particular law.
In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 22 the United States Supreme Court created limitations on the
award of fees to prevailing defendants in actions under Title VII.23 After
the Christiansburg decision, Congress expressly codified that limitation in
several other federal attorneys' fee statutes.Y The application of the Chris-

suits for damages from violation of orders of Secretary of Agriculture); 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982)
(plaintiff in suits for unfair competition in import trade); 15 U.S.C. § 298 (1982) (party in suits
for false stamping of gold and silver); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982) (plaintiff in Trust in Lending
Act suits); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) (1982) (plaintiff in Equal Credit Opportunity Act suits); 15
U.S.C. § 1918(a) (1982) (plaintiff in damages suits for failure to comply with federal automobile
bumper standards); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1982) (plaintiff in suits for unlawful wiretapping or
eavesdropping); 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3) (1982) (complainant in proceedings for damages for
discrimination or discharge in derogation of statutory right to mine safety); 30 U.S.C. § 938(c)
(1982) (complainant in proceedings for damages for unlawful discrimination against or discharge
of pneumoconiosis victims); 33 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1982) (plaintiff in suits for discrimination or
discharge by reason of participation in enforcement of water pollution standards against
employer); 49 U.S.C. § 11705(d)(3) (1982) (plaintiff in suits to enforce Interstate Commerce
Commission damages awards).
21. The following statutes provide for attorneys' fees only for successful plaintiffs:
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1982); Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(0 (1982); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a) (1982); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B) (1982); Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982).
22. 434 U.S. 412 (1978). See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
23. Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (1982) which provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a) (Supp. III 1985) (antitrust challenges to or joint research
and development ventures).
[T]he court shall, at the conclusion of the action
(1) award to a substantially prevailing claimant the cost of suit attributable to such
claim, including a reasonable attorney's fee, or
(2) award to a substantially prevailing party defending against any such claim the
cost of suit attributable to such claim, including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the
claim, or the claimant's conduct during the litigation of the claim, was frivolous,
unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith.
Id. The statute further provides for an offset of an award if, for example, a plaintiff was
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tiansburg limitation to other party neutral attorneys' fee statutes, however,

has been the subject of much confusion.25 An analysis of the common
purposes of the various attorneys' fee statutes and the rationale of the
Christiansburg decision may provide some guidance for the resolution of

uncertainties regarding similar statutes.
I.

CHRISTIANSBURG GARMENT CO. V. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION

Rosa Helm filed a charge of racial discrimination against her employer,
Christiansburg Garment Co. (Company), with the Equal Employment Op-

portunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC notified Ms. Helm of her right
to sue after its efforts failed. 26 After receiving new statutory authorization

successful but some conduct was frivolous or unreasonable:
The award made under subsection (a) of this section may be offset in whole or in
part by an award in favor of any other party for any part of the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, attributable to conduct during the litigation
by any prevailing party that the court finds to be frivolous, unreasonable, without
foundation, or in bad faith.
15 U.S.C. § 4304(b) (Supp. 1II 1985). See 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a)(3), (f) (1982) (civil liability
regarding electronic fund transfers).
In any action under subsection (a) of this section(1) the amount of the plaintiffs' attorney's fee, if any, shall be determined by the
court; and
(2) the court may, in its discretion, award a reasonable attorney's fee to a prevailing
defendant upon a finding that the State attorney general has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.
15 U.S.C. § 15c(d) (1982) (antitrust).
Such relief may include, but shall not be limited to rescission, reformation, restitution, the award of damages and reasonable attorney fees and court costs. A
defendant may recover reasonable attorneys' fees if the court determines that the
cause of action filed by the plaintiff is frivolous, malicious, or lacking in substantial
merit.
15 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1982).
In any action under this section the court may, in the interest of justice, award the
costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable expert witnesses
fees, to a prevailing plaintiff. Such court may, in the interest of justice award such
costs to a prevailing defendant whenever such action is unreasonable, frivolous, or
meritless.
49 U.S.C. § 2014 (1982) (civil actions enforcing Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety regulations)
at § 2014(e). See also 49 U.S.C. § 1686(e) (1982) (identical language for civil actions enforcing
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety regulations).
25. The courts are split over the application of the Christiansburg limitation to other
attorneys' fee statutes. Compare Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410,
1416 (9th Cir. 1984).(Christiansburg not applied to claims under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1982)) with M & R Inv. Co. v.
Fitzsimmons, 685 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1982) (while court declined to award attorneys' fees under
ERISA, it affirmed district court's adoption of Christiansburgstandard of bad faith claim as
meaning one with no valid basis).
26. 434 U.S. at 414. Mrs. Helm chose not to sue. Id.
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to sue in its own name to prosecute "pending" charges, the EEOC sued the
Company. The trial court granted the Company's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that Ms. Helm's charge was no longer "pending. ' 27
In addition, the Company petitioned for attorneys' fees under section 706(k)
29
of Title VII.28 The trial court, however, denied that request.

Because the statute gave courts discretionary authority to award fees to
the "prevailing party,''30 the United States Supreme Court created a guideline, perhaps more appropriately termed a "limitation," for granting fees
to a prevailing defendant. The Company argued that the only limitation for
granting such fees was provided in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,3
where the Court held that a prevailing plaintiff under Title VII "should
ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render
such an award unjust." 3 2 The EEOC argued that a defendant should recover
fees only if the plaintiff's action was brought in bad faith.33 The Court
created a compromise between the two positions.
The Court gave two reasons for distinguishing the treatment of prevailing
defendants and prevailing plaintiffs. First, the plaintiff is 'vindicating' a
policy that Congress considers of the highest priority. 3 4 Second, when the
plaintiff is successful, by definition, it means that the party required to pay
the attorneys' fees is the party that violated federal law. 35 After looking at
the sparse legislative history, the Court identified two purposes for the
attorneys' fees provisions in Title VII: to encourage plaintiffs to bring a
successful suit 36 and to deter bringing meritless suits. 3 7 The resulting limitation

27. The EEOC argued that the case was "pending" until either the dispute was resolved
or the complaint dismissed. The Company argued that after Ms. Helm was notified of her
right to sue, the EEOC no longer had authority to open the case. The district court agreed
with the latter argument. 434 U.S. at 414 n.3.
28. Id. at 415. See supra note 23.
29. 434 U.S. at 415. The district court apparently required that a suit be "unreasonable
or meritless" in order to grant fees to a defendant.
30. See supra note 23.
31. 390 U.S. 400 (1968), noted in Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 416-19.
32. 390 U.S. at 402. An example of a "special circumstance" is difficult, if not impossible,
to find. One may consider the defendant's inability to pay a fee award "unjust." One court,
however, has rejected the defendant's inability to pay as a "special circumstance." Lenard v.
Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 899-90 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v.
Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981)), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 815 (1983). But cf. Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1045 (4th Cir. 1976)
(trial court's denial of fees upheld where defendant unintentionally violated the law).
33. 434 U.S. at 418.
34. Id. (quoting Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 420 (quoting Remarks of Senator Humphrey, 110 CoNo. REc. 12,724.(1964)).
37. 434 U.S. at 420 (quoting Remarks of Senator Lausche, 110 CoNo. REc. 13,668
(1964)). The court also quoted Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1976), stating:
[From these Senate debates] two purposes for § 706(k) emerge. First, Congress
desired to 'make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious
suit .

.

.' But second, and equally important, Congress intended to 'deter the
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allows trial courts discretion to award attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants
in Title VII cases where the plaintiff's action is determined to be frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation, despite the fact that it was not brought
in subjective bad faith.3"
The bad faith requirements urged by the EEOC would have completely
rendered the party neutral language meaningless. Courts traditionally have
39
equitable powers to award fees against a plaintiff who litigates in bad faith.
This power was demonstrated in Copeland v. Martinez/'4 when the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that the
United States may receive fees from an opponent who litigated in bad faith
even though the relevant fee statute in Title VII prohibited awards to the
federal government.41 The court stated that "the excepting language, supposing it applicable to the federal government as a defendant, was meant to
exclude the United States only from the statutory allowance of fees, governed
by the expansive 'prevailing party' standard, and to leave undisturbed the
narrow equitable exception in cases of bad faith.' '42
Identifying the purpose of the attorneys' fee statute was critical in Christiansburg. Courts should avoid interpretations that would yield a result
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, 43 yet courts should also avoid

bringing of lawsuits without foundation' by providing that the 'prevailing party'be it plaintiff or defendant-could obtain legal fees.
Id. at 975.
38. 434 U.S. at 421. Some courts have imposed further limitations on the availability of
fees for defendants. See, e.g., Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 722 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir.)
(plaintiff's counsel acted unreasonably and vexatiously only on proceeding to trial; attorney's
fee award should be limited to fees incurred during trial), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984);
Wilson v. Continental Mfg. Co., 599 F. Supp. 284, 288 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (fee award to defendant
reduced because of plaintiff's indigence); Goff v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 973,
976 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (plaintiff liable for attorneys' fees after he refused to voluntarily dismiss
claim that appeared factually groundless).
39. See Chrisliansburg, 434 U.S. at 417 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390
U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968)) (footnote omitted).
40. 603 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
41. "[Tlhe court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the [Equal
Employment Opportunity] Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
In Copeland, a black female employee of a federal agency brought suit for race and
gender discrimination in promotions. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. For instance, 80076 of the employee's department was
black, and women outnumbered men more than two to one. Furthermore, the agency promoted
more black than white women. Copeland v. Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 1178, 1179 (D.D.C. 1977).
The court specifically found the action was brought for harassment and constituted an "intentional abuse of the judicial process." Id. at 1181.
42. 603 F.2d at 987 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
43. This is a universal rule of statutory construction which prefers legislative supremacy
and limits judicial activism. Lord Coke explained the rule as early as 1584:
And it was resolved by them, that for the full and true interpretation of all statutes
in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law)
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reading limitations or requirements into statutes which do not exist on the
face of the statute." In Christiansburg, the respect for the textual integrity
of the statute gave way to an interpretation which fully effectuated its
purpose. The attorneys' fee provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 45

as well as many other attorneys' fee statutes,"6 are similar to the requirements
for attorneys' fee awards under the private attorney general theory.4 7 Individuals who have important rights which should be vindicated, may be

pressed to forego the enforcement of their rights when they have little
financial stake in the outcome. The risk of losing the suit deters individuals
from filing a cause of action especially when success brings little, if any,
reward above the costs of counsel. The statutes are designed to take the
financial sting out of litigation and to encourage private litigants to enforce
their rights in court.
If the purpose of party neutral attorneys' fee statutes is merely to provide
fair and equal treatment of litigants, the statutes are unnecessary. In the
absence of attorneys' fee provisions, each party pays their own attorneys'

fees. The attorneys' fee statutes provide for the award of fees to plaintiffs
in order to encourage litigation, thus, routine awards of attorneys' fees to
defendants would necessarily frustrate that purpose. Potential litigants would
be forced to consider not only the prospect of losing, but also the possibility
of paying for the opponent's attorneys. This would, once again, deter injured
plaintiffs from bringing suit to vindicate their rights.

The purpose for statutory provisions which allow courts to award defendants' attorneys' fees is not as obvious. Because such an award necessarily
has a deterrent effect on litigation, the provision for fees to defendants
appears to be internally inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. The

four things are to be discerned and considered:-lst. What was the common law
before the making of the act? 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which
the common law did not provide? 3rd. What remedy the parliament hath resolved
and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth? And 4th. The true reason
of the remedy. And then the office of all the judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, and to suppress
subtle invention and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true
intent of the makers of the act pro bono publico.
Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Repr. 637 (1584), quoted in 2A SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRucnoN 21 (4th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). See also Comment, The Supreme Court's

Use of Statutory Interpretation:Morris v. Gressette, APA Nonreviewability, and the Ideal of
a Legislative Scheme, 87 YALE L.J. 1636 (1978) (examines analytical problems in applying the
Administrative Procedure Act and criticizes the failure to analyze the relevant statute carefully
or consistently).
44. See generally Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 271; Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M. 219, 223, 308 P.2d
199, 202 (1957) ("statute must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not
as the court may think it should be or would have been.
45. See supra note 23.
46. See supra note 24.
47. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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only resolution of the conflicting effects is to assume that the purpose of
the party neutral statute is to encourage some types of litigation and to
discourage other types. 41 The Christiansburglimitation, therefore, promotes
meritorious claims while it deters frivolous claims. Unless different purposes
underlie other fee statutes, the Christiansburg limitation should apply to all
other party neutral fee statutes.
II.

THF EXTRAPOLATION OF THE CHRiSTANsBURG LIMITATION

While the Christiansburg limitation originally applied only to attorneys'
fees granted in Title VII actions, 49 it has been applied to other attorneys'
fee statutes which provide for attorneys' fees to "any prevailing party," or
similar neutral language. Some courts have expressly rejected the limitation,
with unpersuasive reasoning, 50 while other courts have not squarely addressed
the issue.
A.

Federal Courts

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Section 1988 provides that "[imn any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of Sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 ... the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party .. .a reasonable attorney's fee
...."I' The federal courts are in substantial agreement that the Christiansburg limitation should also apply to section 1988.52 The unity of the federal
courts on this issue may be due, a fortiori, to the similar purposes of Title
VII, sections 1981-1983, and sections 1985-1986: the enforcement of civil
rights.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Christiansburg limitation
to section 1988 in Mayer v. Wedgewood NeighborhoodCoalition.5 In Mayer,
the plaintiff was attempting to build rental housing for low-income families
on land that bordered defendant's land. 54 Defendants attempted to block the
construction with a series of administrative proceedings and court actions.

48. Although ... permitting a prevailing defendant an award of attorney's fees
discourages the civil rights litigant from initiating litigation and thus frustrates the
policy of the Civil Rights Acts, the answer undoubtedly is that the Congressional
intention was to encourage responsible litigation but to discourage baseless or
frivolous actions.
Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original).

49. See supra notes 23, 36-38 and accompanying text.
50.
51.
attorneys'
52.
53.
54.

See infra notes 136-58 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The United States is expressly precluded from receiving
fees under section 1988. Id.
See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
707 F.2d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
Id. at 1021.
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Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act charging

defendants with conspiracy to interfere with plaintiff's civil rights.55 Defendants counterclaimed that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action
and that their actions were protected by the first amendment. They also
requested attorneys' fees under section 1988.6 The court specifically ac-

knowledged that "authorization of an award of attorney's fees applies
differently to prevailing defendants than to prevailing plaintiffs.

'5 7

As in

Christiansburg, the difference in application is wholly extratextual.
The United States Supreme Court expressly adopted the Christiansburg

limitation to actions brought under section 1983 in Hughes v. Rowe.58 The
court could "perceive no reason for applying a less stringent standard" to
section 1983 actions. In Hughes, a prisoner challenged a disciplinary proceeding against him. The Supreme Court stated that "these limitations apply
with special force in actions initiated by uncounseled prisoners . . . . An

unrepresented litigant should not be punished for his failure to recognize
subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims.'
2.

59

ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)60 also

includes a provision for the granting of attorneys' fees in an ERISA action. 61
The statute states that "[a] court in its discretion may allow a reasonable

55. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982) which provides:
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from
giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection
of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation,
or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or
advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully
qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of
Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on
account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act
in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have a action
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.
56. 707 F.2d at 1021.
57. Id.
58. 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980) (per curiam).
59. Id. at 15.
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
61. Id. § 1132(g)(1).
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attorney's fee and costs of action to either party. '62 If the action is brought
by a fiduciary of the retirement plan, then "reasonable attorney's fees ...
[are] to be paid by the defendant. ' ' 63The question remained as to whether
the Christiansburg limitation would apply to the nonfiduciary plaintiff bringing an ERISA claim.
The Court of Appeals in Carpenters Southern California Administrative
Corp. v. Russell" was faced with an award of attorneys' fees to a defendant
in an ERISA claim. 6 The action was brought by the administrator of the
employee benefit plan, a fiduciary of the retirement plan. The court noted
that the "court in all situations save one, has discretion to make fee awards
to either party, but that fees must be awarded to the plaintiff if a fiduciary
prevails in an action to recover delinquent contributions."6 Since the fiduciary was not successful in this case, fees could be awarded to the defendant,
according to the trial court's discretion.
The court expressly rejected an application of the Christiansburglimitation
in ERISA actions. The Christiansburglimitation "impermissibly narrows the
scope of the statute with which we are concerned.''67 Instead, the court
reaffirmed five factors which should guide the court's discretion:
(1) the degree of the opposing parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the
ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an
award of fees against the opposing parties would deter others from acting
in similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting fees sought to
benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve
a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits
of the parties' positions."
The first factor is essentially a recognition of the longstanding tradition
of assessing attorneys' fees against a bad faith litigant. The second factor
should be considered irrelevant. Legal rights and responsibilities should not
depend on wealth. Although wealth affects the "collectability" of an award,
wealth should not govern legal rights to an award of fees. The concern of

62. Id.
63. Id. § 1l32(g)(2)(D).
64. 726 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1984).
65. The plaintiff alleged a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982), a failure to make benefit
contributions. Russell, 726 F.2d at 1411-12.
66. 726 F.2d at 1415 (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 1416 (citing Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1264-66
n.24 (5th Cir. 1980)). The court in Iron Workers rejected an argument that successful plaintiffs
should be granted attorneys' fees "as a matter of course 'unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust.' " 624 F.2d at 1265 (quoting Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402) (an
interpretation of the Title II attorneys' fee statute). The Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), extended the rule of Piggie Park to Title VII cases. Id. at 415.
In Iron Workers, the court stated: "If we were to apply the Piggie Park construction to section
502(g) of ERISA [29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g) (1982)] ... we would presumably be obliged to adopt
the Christiansburg bifurcation between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants as well." Iron
Workers, 624 F.2d at 1266 n.24.
68. Russell, 726 F.2d at 1415 (quoting Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446,
453 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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the Christiansburg Court for deterrence is reflected in the third factor. The
fourth factor is a regression to the private attorney general and common
benefit theories. Such a consideration by the court ignores the statute's
purpose of encouraging claims and improperly focuses on, either, the motive
of the plaintiff, or the significance of the final decision. Finally, the fifth
factor tends to encompass the Christiansburg requirement for frivolous
action. The court, however, left itself with more flexibility than the United
States Supreme Court by considering the "relative merits."
The Use of the five factor test is more fluid than the Christiansburg
limitation and may still protect the policies supporting the Christiansburg
decision. 69 The granting of undue flexibility may be criticized, however,
especially in the context of public interest litigation. What constitutes public
interest litigation, however, is open to various interpretations. For instance,
one set of public interest lawyers may represent racial minority employees
in a discrimination suit. Meanwhile, another group of public interest lawyers
may represent nonminority employees, in an intervenor status, to protect
against a resolution of the suit which creates "reverse discrimination." The
question then arises as to whether one lawyer is litigating in the public
interest or whether both attorneys are representing different facets of the
public interest. The issue is unimportant until fee awards are considered. A
test which leaves the court with a great amount of flexibility, such as the
five factor test discussed above, may result in a situation where the plaintiff
is successful but no fees are awarded because the court has manipulated the
factors to reward only those attorneys who represented the court's definition
of the public interest. The more straightforward approach of the Christiansburg Court should be preferred over the balancing of several uncertain
factors test of the Russell court.
Confusion in ERISA cases is understandable when one looks at M & R
Investment Co. v. Fitzsimmons,7° another Ninth Circuit case. The case
7
involved an unsuccessful allegation of an improper loan of ERISA funds. 1
The defendants' request for attorneys' fees was denied and they appealed.
The court stated that "[w]hile it is true that the suit has little merit, it cannot
be labeled 'in bad faith' unless it has no valid basis." 7 2 The court then cited
Christiansburgwith approval, holding that the action was not brought in
bad faith." The standard for governing awards of attorneys' fees to defendants in ERISA actions in the Ninth Circuit remains uncertain.
3.

Section 9e of the Securities Exchange Act

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for the court "in its discre'74
tion" to assess "reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant."

69. See Riussell, 726 F.2d at 1416.
70. 685 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1982).

71. Id. at 285. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (1982).
72. 685 F.2d at 288.
73. Id. (citing Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982).
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Again, this party neutral language posed a problem for some courts. In
Nemeroff v. Abelson, 7 the plaintiff had filed a two-count class action suit
against the author of an article that appeared in Barron's,a weekly financial
newspaper. The editor and publisher of Barron's, and certain investors
engaged in trading in the securities of Technicare Corp.7 6 The plaintiff alleged
that defendants had purposefully leaked inaccurate information about Technicare in order to enable certain investors to trade at a profit. The district
court held that the action was commenced in bad faith and awarded defendants attorneys' fees." The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
examined section 9e of the Exchange Act and the bad faith requirement.
The court stated that "the legislative history of this provision indicates that
Congress included it to deter bad faith actions and 'strike suits.'1 7 Furthermore, the court was guided by the Christiansburg Court's decision
because it had interpreted a "substantially similar provision ....
Allowing attorneys' fees to a defendant without a showing of a frivolous or
meritless action would defeat the congressional purpose of encouraging
enforcement of the statute. To require actual bad faith is unnecessary because
courts have long used equitable powers to impose attorneys' fees on plaintiffs
who bring suits in bad faith.8 0 Hence, the "minimum standard for an award
of fees under Section 9e of the Exchange Act is that set forth in Christiansburg Garment, i.e., the action must have been frivolous and without foundation."'
"79

4.

Voting Rights Act of 1965

The Voting Rights Act of 19652 allows a court, in its discretion, to award
attorneys' fees to a "prevailing party." This neutral language again raised
the issue of whether prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants should
be treated equally or whether the Christiansburglimitation should apply.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Commissioners Court of Medina County v. United States. 3
The Voting Rights Act requires a preclearance from the Attorney General
or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before any
voting practice can be changed. 4 The Attorney General must find that the

75. 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
76. Id. at 343-44.
77. Id. at 347.

78. Id. at 349 (citing S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) and Loss,
1836-42 (2d ed. 1961)).
79. 620 F.2d at 349.

SECURITIES

REOULATION

80. Id. at 349-50.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 350.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
683 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). The statute provides:
Whenever a State or political subdivision ... shall enact or seek to administer
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practice does not promote racial discrimination in order to retain the particular practice. In Medina County, when the Attorney General failed to
give the requisite preclearance, a county in Texas brought a declaratory

judgment action, seeking a declaration that its redistricting plans were not
made with a discriminatory purpose.85 A new plan was given preclearance
and the case became moot. 6 Parties who intervened as defendants requested
attorneys' fees.87
The intervenor-defendants argued that they were "prevailing parties" be-

cause the redistricting plans were not approved and a more favorable plan
was implemented."8 The district court denied the request twice.8 9
The appellate court cited Christiansburgfor the general proposition that

defendants could not recover attorneys' fees unless the plaintiff's action was
frivolous, vexatious, or without foundation. 90 The court reasoned, however,
that the procedural posture of a party 'should

not be dispositive."' 9'

any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964
...such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose
and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color ... and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person
shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been
submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or
subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed
an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown,
to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the
Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made.
85. 683 F.2d at 437-38.
86. Id.at 438.
87. Id. The intervenors were Mexican-American citizens, registered to vote in Medina
County.
88. The court of appeals quoted the appellants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for Attorneys' Fees:
The result of the litigation was that the [1978 and 1979] reapportionment plans ...
were never precleared and a third plan, more favorable to defendant-intervenors,
was finally adopted by Medina County. Moreover, the plan adopted by Medina
County was very similar to the plan advocated by defendant-intervenors.
Id. at 438 (footnote omitted).
89. Id. The court denied the request without opinion. Upon reconsideration, the court
denied attorneys' fees on the ground that the defendant-intervenors were not prevailing parties.
'.[T]hey opposed the compromise settlement between plaintiffs and the U.S. which was the
basis for dismissing the present litigation."' Medina County, 683 F.2d at 438 (quoting Commissioners Court of Medina County v. United States, Civ. No. 80-0241 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 1981)
(order denying attorneys' fees).
90. 683 F.2d at 439.
91. Id. (quoting Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841, 850 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
(awarded fees to defendant-intervenors who challenged an affirmative action plan)).
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Legislative history also supported the court's conclusion that defendants who

were resisting a declaratory judgment were actually seeking to enforce statutory rights.92 Therefore, the court refused to apply the Christiansburg
limitation to defendants who intervened to protect statutory rights. 93 This
result was a natural interpretation of any post-Alyeska attorneys' fee statutes. 94 Intervenor-defendants should be treated like plaintiffs rather than
unwilling defendants because they voluntarily enter the litigation.
5. The Copyright Act
Section 505 of the Copyright Act95 provides for attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party.96 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Diamond v. AmLaw Publishing Corp. 91 held that a "distinction exists between the award of
fees to a prevailing plaintiff and an award to a prevailing defendant. '"98 The
court explained its holding stating that the purpose of the attorneys' fee
statute was similar to the purpose of Title VII: "to encourage the assertion
of colorable copyright claims and to deter infringement. " 99 The court con-

92. In the large majority of cases the party or parties seeking to enforce such
rights will be the plaintiffs and/or plaintiff-intervenors. However, in the procedural
posture of some cases (e.g. declaratory judgment suit under Sec. 5 of the Voting
Rights Act) the parties seeking to enforce such rights may be the defendants and/
or defendant-intervenors.
S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 n.42 (1974), quoted in Medina County, 683 F.2d at
439.
93. 683 F.2d at 440.
94. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. Congress and state legislatures responded to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Alyeska that the private attorney
general theory for awarding attorneys' fees was dead. The purpose behind that theory was to
promote the enforcement of constitutional and statutory rights.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982).
96. In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the
recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an
officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award
a reasonable attorneys' fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.
Id.
97. 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984).
98. Id. at 148 (citing Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. v. Gulf & W. Corp., 534 F. Supp. 606
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (prevailing defendants not entitled to award of attorneys' fees because plaintiff's
claims were not frivolous, unreasonable, or instituted in bad faith)).
99. 745 F.2d at 148 (citing Breffort v. I Had A Ball Co., 271 F. Supp. 623, 627-28
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (fees awarded to plaintiff; in dicta, court described fees to defendants as
penalty for frivolous, baseless, or unreasonable suit); Davis v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.,
257 F. Supp. 729, 731 (S.D.N.Y 1966) (fees awarded to plaintiff)).
In Davis, the court announced in dicta the recurring policy that: "our jurisprudence is to
prevent costs from becoming so burdensome that litigants .. .are discouraged from bringing
suit .... Awarding a counsel fee to a plaintiff against whom some injury has been done would
seem less out of harmony with this policy than award to a winning defendant." 257 F. Supp.
at 732 (citation omitted).
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cluded its analysis by applying the Christiansburglimitation to section 505.100
A federal district court was faced with a defendant's request for fees under
section 505 in Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.'0 The court was not
persuaded that the Christiansburgdecision itself was correct. "This interpretation of the meanings of [Title VII and section 1988] prevails despite
the wholly evenhanded nature of the language of both statutes. Thus it is
clear that the words Congress uses in such statutes does not necessarily
convey the intent of Congress as discerned by the courts."' 0 2 The court
directly attacked the analysis used by the Diamond court. 03 First, the court
stated that "[n]o analogous legislative history exists" in section 505 to that
of Title VII. °4Therefore, the lack of legislative history and the "evenhanded
language" of the statute required equal treatment of plaintiffs and defendants. The Cohen court next argued that the precedent relied on by the
Diamond court revealed "a long line of bootstrapping from nothing to
something."°105

The inconsistency of these decisions has resulted in confusion. Instead of
relying on the absence of legislative history, the court in Cohen should have
presumed similar interpretation of similar language unless the legislative
history compels a different result.
B.

The State Courts

Although several states have attorneys' fee statutes which use party neutral
language, few have addressed the issue of whether the Christiansburglimitation applies. Of those state courts which have considered the issue, fewer
still have adopted the federal rule. One can expect this issue to surface in
all states in the future.
1. Oregon
Oregon is one of four states that have found the Christiansburgrationale
persuasive. However, only the Oregon Court of Appeals has discussed the

100. "When the plaintiff's claims are objectively without arguable merit, however, a
prevailing defendant may recover attorney's fees under Section 505 .... [A] finding of
subjective bad faith is not necessary .... Diamond, 745 F.2d at 148 (emphasis added) (citing
Mailer v. R.K.O. Teleradio Pictures, Inc., 332 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1964) (attorneys' fee award
to prevailing defendant was upheld because plaintiff's copyright claim, while neither "synthetic"
nor "capricious," was "unreasonable")); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 704 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1983)
(attorneys' fee was awarded to defendant because plaintiff's suit was continued in bad faith).
101. 617 F. Supp. 619 (D.C. Va. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986).
102. Id. at 621.
103. See also Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986), in which the
court stated, "[N]or do we accept [Diamond's] double standard for plaintiffs and defendants.
Like the Cohen court, we find no justification for such a departure from the law's presumed
equality of treatment." Id. at 155.
104. 617 F. Supp. at 621.
105. Id. at 622.
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issue. Oregon civil rights law provides for attorneys' fees to go to "the
prevailing party."'16 In Payne v. American-Strevell, Inc.,'0 7 the employerdefendant prevailed and was awarded attorneys' fees. On appeal, the court
noted the similar language and purposes of the Oregon statute and Title
VII.'01 The court specifically adopted the requirement of "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" action by the plaintiff for the purpose of
awarding attorneys' fees to defendants under the Oregon statute.' °9
In Dobie v. Liberty Homes, Inc.," 0 the Oregon Court of Appeals was
faced with a similar situation. An employee was unsuccessful in an action
against his employer because the plaintiff had filed the claim after the statute
of limitations for the claim had already expired."' The employer-defendant
cross-appealed the court's denial of attorneys' fees." 2 The court relied on
the Christiansburganalysis and reiterated the underlying policy of the decision: "If plaintiffs faced the risk of attorney fees simply because they lost,
that would discourage all but the most airtight claims and many violations
of the Act would go uncontested."" 3 It is surprising that the court did not
consider filing a suit after the statute of limitations had run to be meritless
action. The court adopted the Christiansburg rule, but further warned that
the defendants may be entitled to fees if the "plaintiff persists in litigating

the claim after it becomes evident the claim is unreasonable or unfounded." 14
This warning is also a reaffirmation of the equitable power of a court to
award fees when an opponent litigates in bad faith.
2.

Florida

Only the First and Fourth Districts of the District Court of Appeals of
Florida have considered and adopted the Christiansburgrule.
In Village of Palm Springs v. Retirement Builders, Inc.,' '

the court

construed a statute that provided for treble damages and attorneys' fees to
106. The attorneys' fee statute deals with the enforcement of civil rights and is similar to
Title VII's attorneys' fee provision. It states: "In any suit brought under [the] subsection, the
court may allow the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney fees at trial and on appeal."
OR. Rav. STAT.

§

659.121(1) (1985).

107. 65 Or. App. 265, 670 P.2d 1065 (1983).
108. Id. at 267, 670 P.2d at 1065-66.
109. Id. at 268, 670 P.2d at 1066.
110. 53 Or. App. 366, 632 P.2d 449 (1981).

Ill. The employee alleged the employer failed to reinstate him after he suffered a
compensable injury under the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 368, 632 P.2d at 450 (citing
OR. REv. STAT. § 659.415 (1985)). The statute of limitations is one year from the unlawful
employment practice. OR. RaV. STAT. § 659.040 (1985). The plaintiff argued that the failure
to reinstate was a continuing violation, and accordingly, that his complaint was filed within
the applicable time period. Dobie, 53 Or. App. at 369, 632 P.2d at 450. The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument. Id. at 371, 632 P.2d at 451-52.
112. Dobie, 53 Or. App. at 373, 632 P.2d at 453. The request was made pursuant to OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.121 (1985).
113. Dobie, 53 Or. App. at 374, 632 P.2d at 453.
114. Id.
115. 396 So. 2d 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 402 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1981).
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the "prevailing party. 1 1 6 The statute's purpose was not to promote the
enforcement of civil rights, but rather to provide utility consumer protection." 7 Nevertheless, the court found the Christiansburg"situation so sufficiently analogous and written with such clarity, expansion or comment
upon it would be acts of futility.""'
Although this statute, like most other attorneys' fee statutes, leaves the
decision to award fees in the court's discretion, "[j]udicial discretion does
not imply a court may act . . . according to the whim or caprice of the
deciding judge; it means a discretion exercised within the limits of the
applicable principles of law and equity . . . . ""9 The Florida court recognized
that discretion must be used within guidelines and some situations may
constitute a breach of those guidelines. Implicit in the court's discussion is
the assumption that such a breach would result in an award of fees to
defendants in the absence of frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation,
20
or bad faith actions by the plaintiff.
In 1983, in National Union of Hospital Health Care Employees v. Southeast Volusia Hospital District,2' another Florida court was faced with a
different party neutral attorneys' fee statute and a request for fees by a
successful defendant. The statute authorized the state Public Employees
Relations Commission to award all or part of the attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party in a labor dispute before the commission. 22 "In order to
lend substance to this amorphous statutory grant of discretion, the commission ... adopted" the Christiansburgstandard. 23 The court affirmed the
commission's order and found that the union had continued to litigate when
the evidence clearly indicated an unsuccessful claim.'2 Although the union
116. Id. at 198; FLA. STAT. § 180.191(5) (1970) provides: "In any action commenced
pursuant to this section, the court in its discretion may allow the prevailing party treble damages
and, in addition, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the cost."
117. The preamble states:
WHEREAS, it is the legislative finding that there are consumers of electric and
gas utilities who live outside of municipalities that own, operate, manage or control
plants or other facilities supplying electricity, gas or water and sewer services to or
for them within the state who should be protected from excess charges for such
utilities by said municipality in view of the exclusive privilege that the municipality
enjoys.
§ 70-997, quoted in Retirement Builders, 396 So. 2d at 198.
118. 396 So. 2d at 198.
119. Id. at 198-99.
120. Id.
121. 436 So. 2d 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
122. "The commission may award to the prevailing party all or part of the costs of
litigation, reasonable attorney's fees, and expert witness fees whenever the commission determines that such an award is appropriate." FLA. STAT. § 447.503(6)(c) (1981), quoted in National
Union, 436 So. 2d at .296 (emphasis added).
123. 436 So. 2d at 296.
124. 436 So.2d at 297. "That the commission has been parsimonious in awarding
attorney's fees to successful respondents in unfair labor practice cases speaks not to inconsistency
of action, but rather to uniformity in exercising its discretion in a conscientious, cautious
manner." Id.
FLA. STAT.
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made a prima facie case, its efforts to continue the litigation were considered
frivolous. 121 Moreover, the Florida Court of Appeals ratified the commis26
sion's adoption of the Christiansburglimitation.

3.

Minnesota

The Supreme Court of Minnesota found the rationale of Christiansburg
persuasive in Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 2 7 where the court construed a
party neutral attorneys' fee statute related, like Title VII, to employment
discrimination. 21 In Sigurdson, the court stated that "[p]olicy reasons support adoption of the federal standard for awarding attorney fees in cases

brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.'

' 29

After citing and ex-

plaining Christiansburg, the court adopted the Christiansburgstandard in
order to not discourage potential plaintiffs from filing legitimate claims for

fear of being assessed attorneys' fees if the claim is ultimately not successful.

30

4.

Alaska

The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the Christiansburgrationale when it
interpreted a party neutral attorneys' fee provision 3' in Whaley v. Alaska
Workers' Compensation Board.'3 2 The case involved an employee's unsuc-

cessful challenge to a denial of disability benefits and an award of fees to
the employer-defendant. The court noted that "[a] routine grant of attorneys'

fees to employer-defendants would undermine the purposes of the statute
3 As a result,
and severely limit a claimant's ability to seek appellate relief." 11
the court specifically adopted the Christiansburgstandard, noting its source

125. Id. In Christiansburg, the Supreme Court warned that courts should not engage in
"post hoc reasoning" by concluding that a plaintiff's ultimate failure is equivalent to an action
without foundation. 434 U.S. at 421-22. The Florida court addressed this concern:
Finally, although the commission awarded fees despite the union having made a
prima facie case, it did not engage in 'post hoc reasoning.' Rather, as the record
demonstrates, the evidence of which the union was or should have been aware,
overwhelmingly negated a successful claim; but the union continued to litigate.
Under Christiansburg, the union's unreasonable tenacity was grounds for an award
of attorney's fees. In exercising its discretion toward that end, the commission did
not act arbitrarily or outside the law.
National Union, 436 So. 2d at 297.

126. Id.
127. 386 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 1986).
128. The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides: "In any action or proceeding brought
pursuant to this section the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, ...
a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." MiNN. STAT. § 363.14, Subd. 3 (1983).
129. 386 N.W.2d at 722.
130. Id.
131. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.145 (1984).
132. 648 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1982).
133. Id. at 959.
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and its application to workers' compensation claims in other jurisdictions. 3 4
5. California
California has a private attorney general statute which authorizes an award
of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.'35 A California court of appeals
in County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance'3 6 held that a court did
not have to find the plaintiff's suit frivolous in order for the court to award
attorneys' fees to prevailing defendant. The county sued to recover the costs
of dealing with an illegal blockade of a nuclear power plant construction
site. The court held that the county did not have statutory authority to sue
to recover those costs, and found that all of the requirements of the attorneys'
fee statute were met to justify an award of fees to the defendants.1 7 The
court stated that "Section 1021.5 ...provides for a fee award to a 'successful
party' and draws no distinctions between plaintiffs and defendants ....
Allowing Section 1021.5 fees only to complainants would not be consistent
with the express wording or purpose of the statute."' The appellate court
specifically affirmed the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to the defendants from the plaintiffs. 13 9
The court summarily rejected the Christiansburgrationale without directly
referring to that case. The decision appeared to conflict with the California
Supreme Court's admonition that the statute should be interpreted in light
of federal private attorney general fee jurisprudence. 40 The appellate court

134. Id. at 960 n.8 (citing Christiansburg,434 U.S. 412, 422 and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 590 S.W.2d 920, 922-23 (Tenn. 1979)).
135. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1977).

Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against
one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement
of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit,
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a
large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement
are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the
interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any. With respect to actions
involving public entities, this section applies to allowances against, but not in favor
of, public entities, and no claim shall be required to filed therefor.
Id.
136. 178 Cal. App. 3d 848, 223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1986).
137. Id. at 864-70, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 854-59.
138. Id. at 869, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
139. Id. at 870, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
140. The California Supreme Court has relied heavily on the "unanimity" and "timetested workability" of federal precedent in applying section 1021.5. Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal.
3d 621, 634, 652 P.2d 985, 993, 186 Cal. Rptr. 754, 762 (1982) (Christiansburgspecifically
endorsed as valuable precedent for construing section 1021.5). See Woodland Hills Residents
Ass'n, Inc. v. City Council of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 917, 934, 593 P.2d 200, 208-09, 154
Cal. Rptr. 503, 511-12 (1979). The court of appeals in Abalone Alliance apparently not only
found Christiansburgto be unpersuasive, but also Serrano which suggests Christiansburg is
applicable to section 1021.5. See also supra note 13.
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claimed that a distinction between plaintiffs and defendants would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, but the court never articulated
this purpose or explained how it differed from the federal attorneys' fees
statutes.
6.

Washington

The Washington Supreme Court expressly refused to apply the Christiansburg limitation to a party neutral attorneys' fee statute.' 4' The case involved
an unsuccessful antitrust and unfair competition action brought by the
Attorney General against several real estate brokers. The state argued that
the award of attorneys' fees to the defendants was an abuse of the trial
court's discretion. 42 However, the court concluded that although the language in Title VII and the Washington statute was identical, policy differences
43
demanded a result different than the one arrived at in Christiansburg.'
The court's policy focus was that "vindicated defendants should be treated
fairly." 4 The court did not consider the argument that if the purpose of
the statute was fair treatment of the parties, then the statute was unnecessary.
The court was concerned that "[simall businessmen may be forced into
bankruptcy to defend what may turn out to be legitimate business practices." 1 41 Unlike Title VII cases, the plaintiff in a consumer protection action
1 46
is not a 'chosen instrument of Congress' to vindicate public policy.
Consequently, the court refused to apply the frivolous standard used in
Christiansburg. Instead, the court delineated several factors which the trial
court should consider:
1. the need to curb serious abuses of governmental power;"7
2. the necessity of providing fair treatment to vindicated defendants;'
3. the strong public interest in continued vigorous state prosecution of
consumer protection violations;"19
4. the necessity of avoiding hindsight logic in making the determination;11

141. State v. Black, 100 Wash. 2d 793, 676 P.2d 963 (1984) (en bane) (construing WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.86.080 (1961) (amended 1970)).

The attorney general may bring an action in the name of the state against any
person to restrain and prevent the doing of any act herein prohibited or declared
to be unlawful; and the prevailing party mayin the discretion of the court, recover
the costs of said action including a reasotiable attorney's fee.
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.080 (1961) (amended 1970).
142. 100 Wash. 2d at 794, 676 P.2d at 965.

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at

805, 676 P.2d at 971.
806, 676 P.2d at 971.
805-06, 676 P.2d at 971.
805, 676 P.2d at 970-71 (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418-19).

147. State v. State Credit Ass'n, Inc., 33 Wash. App. 617, 657 P.2d 327 (1983) (cause
remanded to trial court for determination of whether to award attorneys' fees based on the
enumerated factors), review granted and cause denied, 689 P.2d 403 (Wash. 1984).

148. Id. at 628, 657 P.2d at 334.
149. Id.
150. Id. See supra note 125 ("post hoc reasoning").
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the case;'"' and
5. the complexity and length of
52
6. the necessity of the lawsuit.
While the court stated that each of these factors is to be considered, it
did not address the issue of the weight to be given each factor. The court
clearly stated that it was not adopting a balancing test."' This six factor test
has the same disadvantages of other overly flexible guidelines, namely uncertainty in application.
The dissent argued that the Christiansburgrationale should apply. "The
Attorney General will now be hesitant or fearful to vigorously enforce
consumer protection laws out of concern of incurring substantial attorney
15 4
Such was the
fee assessments in the event of unsuccessful litigation."
concern in Christiansburg.'"Furthermore, the Washington Consumer Protection Act instructs the judiciary to look to comparable federal law when
construing the state law'56 and federal antitrust law would not allow fees in
this case.' 7 Hence, the dissent argued that the Christiansburglimitation
should apply.
III.

INTERVENORS

The requests for attorneys' fees by intervenors under "prevailing party"
fee statutes present special issues.' 58 Are intervenors "parties" for purposes
of the statute? If so, should different standards apply to intervenors than
those that apply to the original parties? Finally, should intervenor-plaintiffs
be treated differently from intervenor-defendants, or should the procedural
posture of the parties not be dispositive of the fee issue? If intervenordefendants are treated as normal defendants, their liability for attorneys'
fees is limited only by the practically nonexistent "special circumstances"
5 9
limit of Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises. Hence, potential intervenors
will be discouraged from entering litigation to protect their rights. Additionally, the court is disadvantaged by not having available the views of those
interested in the case. Some may argue that intervenors tend to complicate
litigation and therefore, deterrents to their participation in cases are neces-

151. Black, 100 Wash 2d. at 806, 676 P.2d at 971.
152. Id. at 806, 676 P.2d at 971.
153. Id. (citing State Credit Ass'n, 33 Wash. App. 627, 657 P.2d 327 (1983)).
154. Black, 100 Wash. 2d at 810, 676 P.2d at 973 (Dore, J., concurring and dissenting).
155. See supra note 43.
156. Id.at 811, 676 P.2d at 974. See WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.86.920 (1961).
157. See Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 435 F.Supp. 1307 (E.D. Wis.
1977), aff'd, 624 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980), cited in Black, 100
Wash. 2d at 811, 676 P.2d at 974. See also 15 U.S.C. § 15c(d)(2) (1982), cited inBlack, 100
Wash. 2d at 811, 676 P.2d at 974.
158. See generally Tamanaha, The Cost of Preserving Rights: Attorneys' Fee Awards and
Intervenors inCivil Rights Litigation, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.Rav. 109 (1984) (proposes unified
standard for awarding attorneys' fees to intervenors based on the standards now used for
plaintiffs).
159. 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
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sary. This argument ignores the fact that a judge has the discretion to refuse

to allow an individual to intervene in permissive intervention situations if
the intervenor will only add confusion to the case.60 The judge should decide
which intervenors are beneficial to a case and which ones will unnecessarily

confuse the issues. An attorneys' fee policy Which treats intervenors exactly
as defendants will deter both helpful and unhelpful intervenors.
Some courts have treated losing intervenors as losing defendants,161 while
others have been hesitant to require intervenor-defendants to pay the opponents' fees.1 62 One moderate approach may be to make intervenor-defendants liable for fees only to the extent that the intervenor's participation in
163
the case injected additional issues.
In several cases, intervenor-plaintiffs were granted attorney fees. In Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines,

Inc.,'6 a party intervened as an intervenor-plaintiff in an action brought on
his behalf by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which charged
violations of Title VII.165 The Minnesota district court held that he was

entitled to receive attorneys' fees as a "full fledged" party, 16reasoning that
the intervenor-plaintiff was literally the "prevailing party" and therefore

entitled to attorneys' fees under Title VII.167
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with requests for attorneys'
fees from eight public interest groups as intervenor-plaintiffs in Seattle School
District No. 1 v. Washington. 6 In Seattle School District, the school district

challenged a state initiative which would have outlawed the district's voluntary desegregation plan as being unconstitutional under the fourteenth

160. FED. R. Cry. P. 24(b). "In exercising its discretion the court should consider whether
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."
Id.
161. See, e.g., Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1979) (county judge
intervened to offer an alternative desegregation plan for county schools); May v. Cooperman,
578 F. Supp. 1308, 1316-18 (D.N.J. 1984) (legislature intervened to support a state statute),
aff'd, 780 F.2d 240, 253 (3d Cir. 1985); Decker v. United States Dept. of Labor, 564 F. Supp.
1273, 1280 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (diocese and individuals intervened to support use of CETA funds
for parochial school personnel); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 508 F. Supp. 567,
571 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (commonwealth intervened to support a state statute); Wisconsin Socialist
Workers 1976 Campaign Comm. v. McCann, 460 F. Supp. 1014, 1058-59 (E.D. Wis. 1978)
(state intervened to support a state statute).
162. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 70 F.R.D. 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (school
administrator's union intervened to defend examination system used to select school supervisory
personnel); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 524 F. Supp. 1214, 1217
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (white employees intervened to defend legality of civil service examination).
163. See infra notes 164-83 and accompanying text.
164. 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980).
165. Id. at 383.
166. Id. at 389. The court also noted that neither party objected to the intervention and
that the intervenor's attorney conducted much work, due to the inability of the EEOC counsel.
Id.
167. Id.
168. 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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amendment. 6 9 The public interest organizations raised an additional argu70
ment that the district operated an unconstitutional dual school system.1
The court held that the intervenors could be awarded fees for the new
argument they raised, but not for the argument which was adequately covered
7
by the school district.' '
In the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision of Donnell
v. United States, 72 intervenor-defendants sought attorneys' fees in an action
involving the Voting Rights Act of 1965.173 The court in dicta reinforced the
holding of Murphy Motor 74 by stating, "[Hiad this been a successful suit
by these intervenors as plaintiffs . . . then, their entitlement to attorneys'
fees would hardly be in doubt."'7 The legislative history of the Act scantly
supported awards to intervenor-defendants. 7 6 The court held that, although
intervenor-defendants may be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, "we
do not believe Congress intended that such an award be as nearly automatic
77
as it is for a party prevailing in its own right."'
Stating that the purpose of the attorneys' fee provision of the Voting
Rights Act was to enable citizens to sue as "private attorneys general,'' 17
the court held that an intervenor should not be granted fees if "the intervenor
contributed little or nothing of substance in producing the outcome."' 179 The

169. Id.at 1341.
170. Id.
171. Id.at 1349.
172. 682 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1983).
173. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). Id. at 243. Title 42 U.S.C.
section 1973(e) (1982) provides: "In any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees
of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
174. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
175. Donnell, 682 F.2d at 245. ."The result of the litigation furthered the purpose of the
Voting Rights Act." Id.
176. In the large majority of cases the party or parties seeking to enforce [civil]
rights will be the plaintiffs and/or plaintiff-intervenors. However, in the procedural
posture of some cases (e.g., a declaratory judgment suit under Sec. 5 of the Voting
Rights Act), the parties seeking to enforce such rights may be the defendants and/
or defendant-intervenors.
Id. at 246 (quoting S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 n.42 (1975)).
The legislative history of section 1988 contains a similar reference as its only support for
fees to intervenors. Id. at 246 n.10 (quoting S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.4
(1976)).
177. Donnell, 682 F.2d at 246. Cf. Mayer v. Wedgewood Neighborhood Coalition, 707
F.2d 1020, 1021 (1983) (prevailing plaintiff in civil rights action should "ordinarily" recover
an attorneys' fee but prevailing defendant should not).
178. Donnell, 682 F.2d at 246. The court analogized the Voting Rights Act's purpose to
the purpose of section 1988, a similar provision providing for the award of attorneys' fees to
prevailing parties in civil rights cases. Id.
179. Id. at 247.
By providing for attorneys' fees to be awarded in actions brought to vindicate the
civil rights laws, Congress did not intend to allow private litigants to ride the back
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court remanded the case for a determination of the propriety of a fee award
to intervenor-defendants. 80
Without directly citing to the Christiansburg decision, one court has
applied its holding to intervenor-defendants. In Kirkland v. New York State
Departmentof Correctional Services, ' minority employees challenged a civil
service examination used by the defendant. Nonninority employees intervened to protect their rights from the implementation of an affirmative
81 2
action plan. The plaintiffs requested fees from the intervenor-defendant.
The Kirkland court held that the purpose of Title VII was to encourage the
bringing of claims to court. Because the intervenors were bringing claims,
the court reasoned, they should be protected as plaintiffs from being assessed
the opponent's fees without a finding of frivolous or meritless action."8 3

IV. EXAMPLES OF FRIVOLOus ACTIONS
Since frivolous action is required in order for a defendant to be entitled
to an award of attorneys' fees under several statutes,s 4 counsel for both
parties should be informed as to what the court considers a frivolous action.
Furthermore, a court may be required to make a specific finding of frivolous
or meritless action in order to justify an award of fees to defendants. 8
Courts are understandably hesitant to declare a case of first impression
to be frivolous, therefore, it may be helpful to determine actions that have
not been considered frivolous. For example, an action may not be deemed
frivolous if it was able to withstand a motion to dismiss,' even if the
complaint was "riddled with elementary legal errors."' 187 Actions are also
deemed not frivolous where there is some basis on which a jury may resolve
the issue in the plaintiff's favor. 88

of the Justice Department to an easy award of attorneys' fees. Obviously, if an
intervenor did nothing but simply show up at depositions, hearings, and the trial
itself, and spend lots of time reading the parties' documents, an award of attorneys'
fees would be inappropriate. The same would be true if the intervenors' submissions
and arguments were mostly redundant of the Government's or were otherwise
unhelpful.
Id. at 249.
180. Id.
181. 524 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
182. Id. at 1217.

183. Id. at 1218-19.
184. See, e.g., supra note 24.
185. See Davis v. Mills, 777 F.2d 1524 (l1th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (court of appeals
remanded because of trial court's failure to make the "specific findings required by the
Christiansburg rule").
186. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970). The
court stated that "[iln several cases which became moot, courts have said suits were 'meritorious'
if they could have survived a motion to dismiss." 424 F.2d at 167.
187. LeGare v. University of Pa. Medical School, 488 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1980).

188. Keown v. Storti, 456 F. Supp. 232, 245 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d
Cir. 1979)
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In InterstatePipe Maintenance, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,8 9 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the claim, which was barred by res judicata, was
frivolous and, therefore, the defendant was entitled to fees under the state
statute. 90 In another case, the lack of evidence rendered the action frivolous.191 A plaintiff whose action was twice dismissed for lack of prosecution
was liable for his opponents' fees. 192 Many cases give examples of actions
to avoid. 93 Also, novel arguments may have additional risks of being held
9
frivolous rather than merely the prospect of losing. "
Although frivolousness must be determined upon the facts of a particular
case, courts have adopted factors to consider to determine whether a plain-

189. 775 F.2d 1495 (l1th Cir. 1985).
190. Id. at 1497-98. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1987) provides:
The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in equal
amounts by the losing party and the losing party's attorney in any civil action in
which the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of
either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of the losing party; provided,
however, that the losing party's attorney is not personally responsible if he has
acted in good faith, based on the representations of his client.
The Florida courts previously interpreted the absence of a justiciable issue as being equivalent
to frivolousness. See Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 384 So. 2d 171, 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(frivolous action is one that is "so clearly devoid of merit both on the facts and the law as to
be completely untenable") (emphasis in original), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1980).
191. Soto v. Romero Barcelo, 559 F. Supp. 739 (D.P.R. 1983). "Plaintiffs simply had no
evidence in support of their claims." Id. at 744. Where "a plaintiff proceeds on the strength
of allegations [alone], which are unsupported and indeed contradicted by unrebutted deposition
testimony, attorney's fees should be awarded to a defendant who obtains summary judgment
in his favor." Id. at 743 (footnote omitted). See also Brown v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 560
F. Supp. 391, 405 (D.N.J. 1983) (individual defendants in civil rights action awarded attorneys'
fees because "plaintiff produced no evidence" to substantiate his discrimination claims); Goff
v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 973, 976 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (plaintiff refused to
voluntarily dismiss claim after it appeared factually groundless).
192. Rogers v. Kroger Co., 586 F. Supp. 597 (S.D. Tex. 1984). The plaintiff had prosecuted
a "spurious claim with . . . total arrogance and indifference to court procedures [causing the]
defendant to incur four years of needless inconvenience and expense." Id. at 603.
193. See, e.g., Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 697 (7th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff's claim that
his employers had terminated him in retaliation for exercising his first amendment rights by
submitting a claim for overtime was "simply preposterous"); Charves v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 711 F.2d 462, 465 (1st Cir. 1983) (sex discrimination was frivolous because plaintiff's
evidence was not credible); Rapisardi v. Democratic Party, 583 F. Supp. 539, 540 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (plaintiff who alleged that he was dismissed from his job for reasons connected with his
political activity failed to meet initial burden of proving that political consideration motivated
termination); Hughes v. Defender Assoc., 509 F. Supp. 140, 141 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (employment
discrimination action was groundless because of lack of evidence); Woods v. New York, 494
F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (action raising "serious and damaging" discrimination
charges, without a "modicum of substantiating evidence," was frivolous and unreasonable);
Sierra v. Datapoint Corp., 459 F. Supp. 668, 671 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (plaintiff's employment
discrimination claim had no basis in fact, and she engaged in vexatious litigation for the purpose
of inconveniencing her former employer).

194. See Kostiuk v. Town of Riverhead, 570 F. Supp. 603 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (dog owner's
claim of denial of constitutional rights when her loose and unlicensed dog was impounded was
frivolous).
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tiff's action is frivolous. In Reichenberger v. Pritchard,9 for example, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals garnered several factors from other cases

to develop a standard for determining the frivolousness of an action. The
court looked to:
1. whether the issue is one of first impression requiring judicial resolution; 'll
2. whether the controversy was sufficiently based upon a real threat of
injury to the plaintiff;'- and
3. whether the trial court made a finding that the suit was frivolous and
the record supports the finding.' 98

Courts have also been willing to give partial fees to defendants when these
factors are found in only part of a suit,' 99 as well as to reduce the award
due to the plaintiff's indigence. 0°
In Hamilton v. Daley,20' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with

the trial court that a lawsuit was frivolous when the plaintiff alleged a
violation of civil rights by state prosecutors. 20 2 Because the United States
Supreme Court had clearly provided for prosecutorial immunity, this claim

was considered frivolous. 20 3 The court stated that "[ijgnorance of the law is
no excuse; it is the responsibility of counsel to know the law and to know
whether a claim is clearly foreclosed by precedent.

' 20 4

The court hinted,

195. 660 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1981) (section 1988 claim of conspiracy to eliminate nude
dancing in plaintiff's night clubs by interfering in municipal administrative proceedings).
196. Id. at 288 (citing Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 423-24). But cf. Palmer v. Coons, 581
F. Supp. 1160, 1161-62 (D. Vt. 1984) (plaintiff's characterization of case as novel and one of

first impression did not preclude finding that action was frivolous).
197. 660 F.2d at 288 (citing Olitsky v. O'Malley, 597 F.2d 303, 305 (1st Cir. 1979)).
198. 660 F.2d at 288 (citing Vorbeck v. Whaley, 620 F.2d 191, 193 (8th Cir. 1980)).

199. Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 722 F.2d 209, 210 (1984) (plaintiff's counsel acted
unreasonably and vexatiously only on proceeding to trial; fee award should be limited to fees
incurred during trial).

200. See Wilson v. Continental Mfg. Co., 599 F. Supp. 284, 288 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
(plaintiff's indigence warranted a downward adjustment in defendant's fee award).
201. 777 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1985).
202. Id, at 1210. The plaintiff was convicted of contributing to the sexual delinquency of
a minor. A new trial was granted and the "state's attorney's office nolleprosequiedthe charge."
Id.
203. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Court granted absolute immunity to
prosecutors in activities "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."
Id. at 430.
204. 777 F.2d at 1212 (citing Werch v. City of Berlin, 673 F.2d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 1982)).

In Werch, the plaintiff sought an injunction against local officials in regard to a tax assessment
allegedly in violation of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The court
relied upon the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), which precludes the contesting
of a state law in a section 1983 action if a "plain, speedy and efficient state remedy" is
available. 673 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir.. 1982). Three separate remedies existed under state law
in Werch. Hence, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and plaintiffs' action was meritless.
Id. at 195.
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however, that a pro se litigant may be entitled to greater leniency in regard
to his obligation to "know the law." 205
Actions that are against those with immunity, outside the statute of
limitations, or barred by res judicata, are obviously frivolous. Not so easily
discernible in terms of frivolousness are cases of first impression or new
legal theories. Cases which provide opportunities for arguments favoring
changes in law are sometimes desirable, and therefore, parties should not be
threatened with attorneys' fees because they dared to challenge "bad precedent." Characterizing legal action as frivolous should be done sparingly.
CONCLUSION

Although the American rule denies recovery of attorneys' fees from unsuccessful opponents, numerous statutes, both state and federal, authorize
the award of fees to the prevailing party. In regard to two fee statutes,
section 1988 and Title VII, the United States Supreme Court has limited the
award of fees to defendants to situations where the plaintiffs' action was
frivolous, meritless, or without foundation. The Court imposed this limit as
a necessary restriction to further the purposes of the fee statutes, which seek
to encourage private parties to seek enforcement of rights and to discourage
frivolous claims.
Courts should presume that all of the other party neutral statutes have
similar purposes. The supposed "equity of treatment" purpose is unconvincing because parties are treated equally in the absence of a fee statute
under the American rule. Therefore, unless another purpose can be clearly
identified from legislative history, the Christiansburglimitation should be
applied to all other party neutral attorneys' fee statutes. Otherwise, the clear
purpose of encouraging legal enforcement of rights will be unnecessarily
frustrated by indiscriminate awards of fees to defendants.

205. 777 F.2d at 1212 n.1 (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980)).

